DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 297 392 CS 506 290

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TITLE The Life-Embeddedness of Argumentation: A Prelude to Treating Arguments as Exhortations.
PUB DATE Nov 88
NOTE 37p.; Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association (74th, New Orleans, LA, November 3-6, 1988).
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Viewpoints (120)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC02 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Communication Research; *Persuasive Discourse; *Rhetorical Criticism; Theories; Verbal Communication
IDENTIFIERS Exhortation; Rhetorical Devices; *Rhetorical Theory; Rhetoric as Epistemic

ABSTRACT

Argumentation is fundamentally exhortative: arguments can be understood as invitations to emulate the lives of those who make the arguments. The human exemplar of an argument's substance, e.g. Jesus Christ as exemplar of Christianity, is the paradigm for this theory in which the arguer's identity is seen both as equal in importance to and inseparable from the argument's contents. Just as Ludwig Wittgenstein contends that linguistic activity occurs within a form of life, the exhortative theory shows that argumentation is an activity inextricably bound to human conduct. Paradigms such as storytelling, jurisprudence, and scientific method have been used to describe argument, but these attempts to universalize do not allow for the diversity of forms of argument. The exhortative theory does not supplant current theories of argumentation but adds to them. (Forty-five references are attached.) (MHC)

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The Life-Embeddedness of Argumentation: A Prelude to Treating Arguments as Exhortations

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Presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention
New Orleans, Louisiana
November 1988

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The Life-Embeddeness of Argumentation: A Prelude to Treating Arguments as Exhortations

Beginning from the Wittgensteinian contention that linguistic activity occurs within a form of life, this paper elaborates how arguments can be understood as invitations to live in ways comporting with the acts of those who make argumentative claims. The human exemplar of an argument's substance, e.g. Christ's exemplification of Christianity, is treated as a fundamental part of argument theory. Argumentation dependent on exemplars is offered as a corrective for several shortcomings and omissions in current theories, and its relevance is shown in a brief case study of how National Socialist rhetoric might be analyzed.

The Life-Embeddedness of Argumentation: A Prelude to Treating Arguments as Exhortations

In his characteristically cryptic prose style, Ludwig Wittgenstein remarks: "[T]o imagine a language means to imagine a form of life (1958, §19). Wittgenstein's comment points to how linguistic activities are embedded within matrices of available communicative choices.[1] This essay examines what significance forms of life have for argumentation theory and practice. Rather than determine the substance of *Lebensformen*, I seek to establish a theoretical foundation for including such a notion within our understanding of how arguments are formulated. Indeed, the habitual pluralization "forms of life" cautions against seeking a unitary essence of the concept. Wittgenstein indicates that establishing what counts as seeing, doubting, counting, etc. is not a purely empirical matter of cataloguing what is seen, doubted, or counted (1958, p. 197).

The position emerging from my apparently kaleidescopic overlay of Wittgenstein upon argumentation is that arguments invite audiences to live in particular ways. Phrased more broadly, argumentation is fundamentally exhortative. This offering of life-alternatives has close affinities with

1. Although communicative choices within language-games are made in accordance with social customs and maxims, in the Gricean sense, *Lebensformen* themselves are not products of social conventions.

Wittgenstein's conception of linguistic activities occurring within a form of life. The connection between my view of argumentation and Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy will emerge in subsequent sections.

My development of an exhortative outlook on argumentation proceeds in three steps. First, I justify my approach in light of the apparent overabundance of theorizing about argument. This justification is followed by a brief examination of the roles paradigms play in argumentation theories. My survey of paradigms leads to a consideration of the part they play in understanding argumentation and how the human exemplar functions as a paradigm. The second section elaborates on the portrayal of argument as exhortative and includes an examination of objections and advantages associated with my viewpoint. Finally, I offer some general suggestions concerning the human element in argumentation.

Another Theory, Another Paradigm?

The addition of yet another perspective on argumentation might raise some eyebrows among those who already lament the proliferation of argument theories. My project, however, diverges from current theories at several points. Wittgenstein's legacy to communication studies has been primarily one of fragmentation. Language games seem to divide the discursive world into insular communicative sectors analogous to Leibnizian windowless monads without pre-established divine harmony. Argumentative procedures

are tied to their respective linguistic communities, and arguing across these boundaries is difficult or impossible due to the lack of shared procedural norms, evaluative standards, or communal notions of what constitutes an argument at all. The most radical justificational challenges in ethics, for example, emerge when interlocutors fail to agree on parameters for what would count as a statement having truth-value or on standards for what would count as a statement at all (Wellman, 1971, pp. 185, 205). Such failures to establish consensual points of departure for arguing typify what might happen when interlocutors attempt to argue across linguistic communities.

Wittgenstein has also been appropriated as a contextualizer who binds language use to particular circumstances (Buttny, 1986, p. 264). Theories which portray discourse as occurring within the social or normative parameters of discursive communities owe a heavy theoretical debt to Wittgenstein. The concept of language-games seems to be the unnamed culprit lurking just beneath the surface of attacks on *Weltanschauung* philosophies (see Bokeno, 1987). The compartmentalization of arguments into fields (Toulmin, 1958, p. 14) is reminiscent of Wittgenstein's plea to understand justification as having meaning only within the context of its use in particular linguistic activities (Wittgenstein, 1958, §486; cf. Willard, 1982, p. 33).

My employment of Wittgenstein relies on the assumption that his understanding of language can illuminate interfield argumentative assumptions and processes as well as emphasize the mutual dependence of discursive communities.[2] Instead of identifying a linguistic community and asking: "What sorts of arguments are allowable here?" a more productive route might be to begin with arguments themselves. Theorists could then ask: (1) What systematic linguistic activities can be presupposed here, and (2) What basic assumptions about language use infuse argumentation and could enable us to communicate across linguistic communities?

A feature emerging from such an orientation is the exhortative character of arguments. By 'exhortative' I mean that arguments can be understood as invitations to emulate the lives of those who make the arguments. I hasten to add that my objective is not to find a single quality all arguments share which might count as their essence. Any attempt to stipulate an invariant core of argumentative content or procedure is always subject to exceptions and borderline cases that frustrate settlement on what comprises

2. Two points deserve mention here. First, I intentionally avoid Toulmin's distinction between field-invariant and field-independent procedures and criteria for effective argument. Toulmin's terminology encourages theorists to think in terms of a misleading dichotomy: either fields are self-contained or a transcendental logic of argument guides argumentative practice. These alternatives are extreme and probably beyond what Toulmin could be expected to support, but his posing such a bifurcation invites conceptual tunnel vision. Second, when I stress the mutual dependence of discursive communities, I certainly do not wish to minimize the differences that do exist between these communities.

the essence of any argument (cf. Wittgenstein, 1958, §66). Willard has demonstrated that presumption, for example, is not a unisemic term, but acts as a universal only under the condition that it be an abstract, formal way of configuring the minimal standards of proof holding sway within argumentative fields (1983, pp. 129-134, 241). A universal quality of argumentation, therefore, is gained at the expense of emptying that universal of all particular content. How, then, can any model of argumentation account for the diversity and flexibility of argumentative practices? The next section will be devoted to answering such a question. Before an answer can be given, it is necessary to review the roles of paradigms in argumentation theory.

A Whirlwind Tour of Paradigms

The proposal that narration typifies human communication (Fisher, 1984, 1985) raises, despite its limitations (Warnick, 1987; Rowland, 1987a), an important point concerning the ways argumentation is understood. The key issue emerging from Fisher's work is not whether narration subsumes other modes of reasoning (Fisher, 1984, p. 3), but whether argumentation need be understood solely or primarily as a single type of human activity, such as making logical inferences (Fisher, 1984, p. 1). Recast in broader terms, Fisher's study of narration, like Willard's (1983) work, raises the prospect of treating argumentation as a human activity encompassing a variety of social

practices. What *counts* as an argument remains an open question, and the scope of what constitutes an argument is a central issue in criticisms of Fisher's theories (Rowland, 1987a) as well as in attempts to stipulate definitions of argument (Rowland, 1987b; Hample, 1980). One means of understanding a conception of argument is to examine the paradigms of argumentative procedures it takes to be the norm or standard for how argumentation is conducted. This examination of paradigms not only provides a means for discovering a theory's basic assumptions, but it also serves to expose how an exhortative theory of argumentation diverges from other theoretical perspectives.

A brief overview of some current argumentative paradigms indicates the diversity of approaches to argumentation. Fisher proposes storytelling not only as the essential form of persuasion, but as the basic means of human communication. The characterization of humans as *homo narrans* (Fisher, 1984, p. 6), when applied specifically to arguments, renders the argumentative process fundamentally diachronic. Narration emphasizes sequence, the order of communicative events in time (Fisher, 1984, p. 2). This sequencing manifests itself in the temporal progression of the narrative itself (Fisher, 1984, pp. 8-10; 1985, p. 349) and in the historicity of the narrative's relationship to the moral aspirations and ideals of human societies (Fisher, 1984, pp. 16-18; 1985, p. 347).

Toulmin uses a jurisprudential model and makes courtroom procedures the paradigm not only of argument, but of logic itself (1958, pp. 7-8). Toulmin envisions argumentation as a process of rational criticism wherein claims are adjudicated on the basis of how they fare against relevant, case-specific logical standards of effective reasoning and evidential support (1958, pp. 7-8, 17, 41-43). This understanding of argument presumes a rational core to all argumentation. An argument is not worthy of the name if it does not at least imply a warrant in its behalf (Toulmin, 1958, p. 98).

Some theorists prefer to treat scientific method as the paradigm for argumentation. Willard (1983, pp. 178-196) rejects Toulmin's jurisprudential model and opts for considering arguments "subject-designed experiments in which arguers try out hypotheses and evaluate results" (1983, p. 259). This scientistic vantage point calls attention to arguer-dependent means of producing and evaluating arguments (Willard, 1983, p. 259). Zarefsky (1987) employs a paradigm of scientific hypothesizing to characterize the argumentative process of academic debate. The debater, according to Zarefsky, defends claims against any plausible counter-claims in much the same way that a scientist defends an hypothesis against alternative proposals.

Wellman (1971) patterns his study of justification in ethics on a dialectical give-and-take process of supporting claims in response to challenges offered against them.

Likening tests of ethical theories to the scientific method, Wellman locates the evaluation and formulation of arguments in exchanges between arguers (1971, pp. xi, xii, 126-127) instead of in the psychological process of objectifying standards of argumentative quality and propriety (Willard, 1983, p. 262). Justification, according to Wellman, is a "psychological process of causing challengers to withdraw their challenges" (1971, p. 129). The psychological aspect of argumentation is a result of arguments actually offered which cause arguers to be reassured or upset (Wellman, 1971, pp. 124-125). Willard, in contrast to Wellman, places psychological processes at the forefront of argumentation, claiming that personal constructions of reality col r all arguments (1983, p. 45). "Subjectivism," for Willard, "...constitutes the starting point of argumentation theory" (1983, p. 202), because argument criticism proceeds on the basis of the perspective-taking (1983, pp. 259-267) emerging from "a stance a person takes" (1983, p. 262).

Paradoxes of Paradigms

These characterizations of argument seem to be straightforward generalizations based on paradigm cases (cf. Willard, 1983, pp. 27-56), and the extrapolations appear unproblematic once it is settled what counts as a paradigm case. Rowland, however, has pointed out the circularity of such a procedure (1987b, p. 145). Examples of arguments do not emerge unless an understanding of what counts as argumentation is presupposed. No theory of argumentation is

purely inductive, generalizing about the nature of argument *per se* solely on the basis of patterns emerging from collections of particulars observed without the benefit of any conceptual framework. In other words, the search for paradigm cases is to a large extent a self-fulfilling prophesy. The imposition of paradigmatic case models on actual argumentative practice is often portrayed as a discovery that argumentation already has the qualities of whatever paradigm is being used.

Another difficulty with the current employment of paradigms is the ambiguity of the term 'paradigm'. There are at least two senses of paradigm which are not clearly distinguished when the term is employed. The first major sense of paradigms is descriptive, hereafter denoted P(d), which contains two variants. One way to configure paradigms descriptively is to treat them as typical examples, roughly equivalent to the model verbs used to illustrate types of verb conjugations in various languages. This usage will be symbolized P(d1). In German, the verb *schreiben* [to write] illustrates in the spelling changes of its stem the vowel shifts an entire class of verbs undergoes in the present, past, and perfect tenses.

A second variant of P(d) is the treatment of paradigms as the most common instances, a making paradigms analogous to arithmetic modes. According to this perspective, P(d2), the most frequently occurring case should be the most representative. P(d2) differs from P(d1), as shown by the

fact that two of the most frequently used verbs in any language, "to have" [*haben*] and "to be" [*sein*], also tend to have irregular conjugations despite their common occurrence.

Another way to treat paradigms is normatively. This employment of paradigms will be denoted P(n). A normative paradigm seeks to identify "norms or ideals, broad aims toward which people should strive" (Willard, 1983, p. 28). The P(n) paradigm need be neither typical nor common. Socrates, the paradigmatic Platonic philosopher, disdains majority opinions in favor of arguments offered by those who have the moral fiber and intellectual training resulting from philosophical contemplation (Plato, *Laches* 184e).

The two major types of paradigms, P(d) and P(n), are not mutually exclusive, but they do operate in tension with each other. This distinction in usage is important, because argument theorists sometimes proceed oblivious to the different research agendas they pose. Willard, for example, delineates a complex scheme for distinguishing among the senses of paradigms (1983, pp. 28-32). Despite his care, however, he concludes with a normative statement posed in factual terms: "Arguments--understood as social comparison processes--are subject-designed experiments in which arguers try out hypotheses and evaluate results" (1983, p. 259). Willard clearly wants to understand argumentation from a P(d) perspective (cf. O'Keefe, 1985), but his scientistic outlook is more wishful than empirical, judging from how unscientifically most arguers and arguments proceed.

We need not argue with a pre-formed agenda in mind, as Willard seems to assume we do (or should). Remembering the extent to which narrative and argument intertwine, it is not surprising that argumentation can proceed according to the way narrative patterns unfold as a product of the narrative's own logic.[3] The so-called hypothesis is not something formulated logically and temporally prior to argument, but it can develop by means of the argumentative process itself. Rorty's idea of edification demonstrates how, if arguments are treated as ongoing conversations, they can and do take place without the prior formulation of a *telos* for where discourse might lead (1979, pp. 373-379).

The function of an argument might not be to 'prove' anything at all. An interlocutor might engage in argument to establish, overturn, or reinforce power relationships with other individuals or institutions. In arguments dealing with empowerment, to speak of proof in a scientific sense is misguided. The power relationships are enacted rather than proved. The history of political regimes is rife with examples of how policies are often carried out only to be justified *ex post facto*, under the duress of an investigative committee or a discontented public. The means of expressing and establishing power claims often involve employing terms with so little denotative content that they

3. That a narrative progresses according to an internal logic is not a sign of its independence from influences external to the narrative. The point I wish to make here is that we should respect the integrity of a narrative's own structure and function before attempting to subordinate it to a transcendent Nature of Argument.

cannot be used to test or prove anything scientifically. The lesson to be learned from the conflation of the different senses of paradigms is that any paradigm will set a research orientation. The significance of this direction requires further elaboration.

The fundamental problem with paradigms is that in the examples I have used, the paradigms of argumentative activity are simply aggregates of actual argumentative practices. In other words, the descriptions or evaluative criteria for judging arguments are established by means of universalizing particular methods of arguing. This strategy is equivalent to picking a single linguistic activity as the basis for understanding all possible linguistic actions. The attempt to make jurisprudence, science, or storytelling the essence or pinnacle of all argumentative practice sidesteps the varieties of argumentative activities (cf. Wittgenstein, 1958, §304). If Willard is correct in his assertion that universal argumentative characteristics must be content-free (1983, p. 241), then paradigms modeling all argumentation on one type of argumentative practice have limited theoretical justification. The practical applications of such paradigms are no more apparent. If the starting point for all argument theory is the individual's consciousness (Willard, 1983; Hample, 1980), then the paradigm cases would have to infuse not only argumentative practice, but the motives and intentions of the arguers as well. In other words, it would be necessary to prove that

arguers actually employ the paradigm as a model or standard whenever they engage in argumentation. This burden would indeed be a difficult one to fulfill.

Argument as Exhortation

What Alternatives might be offered to avoid transforming purportedly descriptive argument theories (cf. Willard, 1983, p. 36) into universalizations of particular kinds of argument? An answer to this question could prove worthwhile. If paradigm cases exemplify "situated speech" (Willard, 1983, p. 32; cf. O'Keefe, 1985, pp. 196-198) bound to specific spheres of argumentative activity, then argument criticism would rely on establishing a hierarchy of argumentative practices with P(n) paradigms at the apex to serve as evaluative standards. Another possibility is that arguments can be criticized only *ad hominem*, according to standards indigenous to the arena within which an argument is produced (cf. Johnstone, 1978). If all argumentative fields are on a par, however, with interfield argument seen as problematic, we are left in the discomforting position Lyne adduces from Rorty's relativism: "How one determines *which* practices govern in a pluralistic society (or in overdetermined situations) is not explained, since there are no critical frameworks that may transcend a particular conversational frame or assist in its mediation with other frames (1982, p. 205, emphasis in original).

There is a way to avoid, or at least minimize the consequences of, the problems already identified in

theorizing from paradigms. If *argument* is understood as a process of attempting to gain voluntary adherence from an audience (cf. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 4), the search for where and how argumentation occurs can follow a more definite direction. Bearing in mind that argument can be construed as a "mode of behavior" (Weimer, 1984, p. 71), I propose what at first might appear trivially obvious: argumentation is a human activity. Upon further reflection, however, my claim has more significance than a cursory examination reveals. When we study argumentation, we do not attend to the relationships among propositions stripped of the historical contexts within which they are made, examined, and modified. The criteria of formal validity and soundness (Cherwitz & Hikins, 1986, pp. 92, 112n) are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for an argument to have pragmatic results. It matters who makes an argument and when it is made.

The arguer's attributes and the argument's timing have long been recognized as cornerstones of effective persuasion, yet they sometimes slip through the cracks of argument theories. Gorgias explains that a mastery of the sense of timing, or *kairos*, enables the speaker to make a point at the moment a maximally positive response is most likely (Gronbeck, 1974). Aristotle contends that *ethos* comprises a speaker's most effective powerful resource (1356a.13-14). *Ethos* is an artistic mode of proof not to be truncated from *logos*. The rhetor's character interacts with

the substance and style of the message itself (cf. Aristotle 1418b.24-33). Willard agrees that personal influence is a key to argumentative success: "Actors can enter fields by consulting other people: graduate students adopt the views of their professors, political activists the views of their leaders" (1982, pp. 40-41). My point is one that Quintilian makes forcefully: audiences judge those who make arguments as well as the arguments themselves, and arguments are woven into the fabric of the interlocutors' lifestyles (cf. Quintilian Bk. XII). Thus the Nazis swore allegiance to Hitler, not just to National Socialism; Christians pattern their lives after Jesus, not simply according to Christian doctrine.

Some of the most useful insights into argumentation can be gleaned from human exemplars who weave themselves into their arguments. Jesus does not merely stand *for* Christianity, he *is* Christianity. Socrates does not talk *about* the contemplative life, he is its epitome. Exemplars can thus serve as living arguments because they gain adherence without having to claim explicitly, "Believe thus...."

My focus on exemplars is not a paradigm in the sense of P(d). On the contrary, the fanatical zeal exemplars can generate indicates that human embodiment of arguments tends to be an extreme case. My reasoning is that a *modus operandi* of arguments can be gleaned from cases where adherence is the strongest. From these samplings, we may

gain not the single essence of argumentation, but ranges of the types of inducements connected with adherence.

The objection might arise that adherence to people making arguments is a process of faith, not of "reasons and evidence" (Rowland, 1987b, p. 148). I offer two responses. First, my emphasis on exemplars accords with ordinary linguistic usage. We say, "I believe you" far more frequently than "I believe this proposition." In many cases, we talk about arguers and arguments interchangeably, as if the substance of the argument were inextricably linked to the person, collectivity, or institution making the argument. Typically we consider a challenge to an argument a challenge against the arguer, as long as the arguer has some stake in making his or her point. The close alliance between arguer and argument surfaces in metonymical transferences where authors of arguments are identified with their positions. It is common parlance when assigning readings to say, "Read Perelman" rather than "Read the arguments Perelman makes." Such usage is more than a locutionary convenience. To position one's self against Perelman's arguments is to oppose Perelman.

A second reply to the charge that I conflate faith with argument is that the distinction between reasoned argument and impassioned faith is by no means clear. The dichotomy is especially untenable if faith is considered unjustifiable. The beliefs upon which rational operations depend are every but as unsusceptible to logical defense as

are the most deeply held religious convictions (cf. Wittgenstein, 1969, §§1, 136, 162). It has become increasingly evident that human activities such as science, traditionally regarded as the most rational and therefore most suitable models for argumentation, rely on methods and assumptions akin to religious commitments and aesthetic judgments (Polanyi, 1958; Kuhn, 1970). Conversely, faith need not consist only of blind assent. Theology, the rational (*logos*) study of God (*theos*), uses reasoning to restore or kindle faith. Theological arguments are not mere ploys to move toward unreasoned obedience. The history of religious thought such as that of Jonathan Edwards (1960) demonstrates faith in reason as much as reasons for faith.

The importance of exemplars raises another issue. If arguers and arguments are intertwined, does it follow that arguments can be understood or judged only when critics or analysts are acquainted with the arguer? If such acquaintance is a necessary prerequisite for understanding and evaluating arguments, problematic consequences ensue. We would never have confidence in our estimates of an argument's value or technique if we lacked access to its author. We would have to abandon any hope of gaining insight into arguments made anonymously or arguments made through institutions or collectivities which obscure individual authorship.

My perspective on argument is not that all arguments involve exemplars. I wish to claim only that stressing

exemplars helps to free argument theory from the narrow confines of purely propositional or message-centered schemes. There is something to be said for textual autonomy, and the point of departure for any understanding of argument is arguments themselves. The importance of exemplars is not emphasized at the expense of other dimensions of argument. My perspective is an addition, not an alternative, to its predecessors.

As for the notion that collectives as well as individuals argue, the exhortative view does not rely on an individual being identified as the author of an argument. Whenever we examine arguments descriptively or evaluatively, we assign an agent to the argument. Social critics, for example, often claim that arguments can be made by institutions. The individual author, in some social criticism and political economy, is relatively unimportant compared to the institutionalized power relationships reproduced and reinforced from one generation to the next. Althusser (1984), for instance, would point out how liberalistic societies reinforce the dominant values of those in power. I see no reason why exhortation should not play a role in collective argument, especially when amusement parks and museums can present ideal lifestyles stemming from an ideologically constructed portrayal of future societies (cf. Schwartzman, 1987). The attractiveness of these futuristic visions of security and wealth is bound to the attractiveness of their social

authors, be they individuals or institutionalized ideological outlooks.

Keeping these points in mind, what significance do exemplars have? Exemplars demonstrate the embeddedness of arguments in life. This life-embeddedness is equivalent to Wittgenstein's contention that linguistic activities occur within the parameters of social forms of life, which amount to the ontological contexts of language-games. Although arguments themselves require justification, the arena within which justification occurs, i.e. the mode of existence where attempting to gain adherence makes sense, remains unscrutinized, accepted, given (Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 226). When arguments are criticized, for example, the arguments themselves are examined, but the assumption that humans can argue forms a stable fulcrum upon which criticism logically depends (cf.Wittgenstein, 1969, §§358, 359).

My contention that arguments are embedded in forms of life should not be confused with the nondiscursive social contexts of argumentation (cf. Willard, 1983, pp. 62-82). Forms of life are not observable in the same sense that nonverbal gestures or facial expressions can be identified. Forms of life are recognizable by the activities taking place within them, such as speaking (Wittgenstein, 1958, §23), although *Lebensformen* are not equivalent to these activities. Arguing, for instance, is an activity which can occur only within language-using forms of life (cf. Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 174). Thus, linguistically bound

activities such as symbol use are uniquely human once we assert that only humans use language (cf. Burke, 1966, pp. 3-9).

The connection between forms of life and exhortation now becomes fully apparent. If argumentation can occur across fields, *Weltanschauungen*, or any other divisions of communicative practice, arguments must appeal to constitutive elements of forms of life. In a word, the most promising prospects for meaningful interfield argument would capitalize on the roots of practices that distinguish human communicative activity from non-communicative or non-human endeavors. If we identify symbol use as a characteristically and distinctly human act (Burke, 1966), then symbolic communication in the form of metaphors and myths would join factually precise description as norms of argumentative practice. This conclusion is a far cry from treating argumentation as logical entailments between decontextualized propositions such as "All men are mortal" and "Socrates is mortal."

An exhortative theory of argument accounts for several argumentative issues heretofore insufficiently developed. First, exhortation can incorporate lies. No argument theory can deal with utterly random lying, for completely chaotic communicative behavior defies understanding. On the other hand, fabricating evidence, falsifying documents, and other forms of deception play a more frequent role in arguments than we might care to admit. Nonetheless, it is tempting to

ignore lies or make honest communication a *prima facie* limitation of a theory's scope. Deceptive communication is exhortative in the sense that lying constructs a communicative environment wherein the liar has a privileged status. Intentional distortion can be understood as a means to construe the liar as possessing expertise or authority on the subject at hand. Lying can also serve as a publicity stunt, a move to gain recognition for the deceiver.

Regardless of the motivation, the communicative environment constructed by means of deception establishes a discursive hierarchy with the liar at its apex. The liar gives himself or herself special leave to speak, act, and judge. The exhortation here is an invitation to participate in a communicative environment where the liar's utterances and opinions are given special weight. In short, lying destroys, ceteris paribus, a symmetrical communicative relationship.

Another difficulty the exhortative view avoids is the tendency to understand arguments as statements describing real conditions rather than as enactments which may include discursive claims. Austin (1975) explains how individual propositions can assume a performative role by enacting behaviors such as promising and consecrating. The performative aspect of utterances does not obliterate their other roles. It is all too easy to limit the scope of argumentation to the substance or form of the claims and evidence while overlooking the fact that argumentation

occurs as an *act* of arguing. We might consider the process of argumentation as a technique akin to riding a bicycle or writing a poem rather than as exhaustively described or governed by procedural or substantive rules (cf. Wittgenstein, 1977, III-119). At this point, it might behoove researchers to bear in mind the different senses in which argumentation is an ongoing process.

The argumentative process can be portrayed in essentialist or non-essentialist terms. From an essentialist perspective, argument assumes the role of a progressive manifestation of an ideal or perfect form. In this sense, argumentation is, in Kenneth Burke's terminology, entelechial (1966, pp. 390-391). The ideal exemplar of an argument, such as Plato's configuration of Socrates as the essence of the contemplative life, offers one of the "possibilities of perfection...*toward* which all stories might gravitate" (Burke, 1966, pp. 390-391, emphasis in original). This entelechial progression toward ever more perfect embodiments of a form coincides with Fisher's contention that narratives have fidelity when their characters manifest ways of life which induce audiences to live in accordance with the narratives (1985, pp. 357-364). If we construe these narratively embedded good reasons as ways of living instead of as prescriptions guiding how life should be lived, the criticism that good reasons provide no judgmental criteria for evaluating arguments (Willard, 1983, pp. 111-113; Wellman, 1971, pp. x-xi; Warnick, 1987, pp.

179-181) appears misdirected. If good reasons are modes of acting rather than sets of normative propositions, then they cannot be expected to give formulae for how to live. In other words, if ethics should be understood as living in certain ways, i.e. enacting ethical convictions (cf. Wittgenstein, 1967, pp. 3, 11), then the essentialist view of exemplars escapes from the morass of propositional guidelines failing to provide necessary or sufficient rules for human conduct.

A non-essentialist portrait of the argumentative process would deny the teleological undertones of entelechial progression. Rorty's concept of "edification" (1979, pp. 360-389) may prove helpful in constructing the non-essentialist position, provided that we apply his comments specifically to the discursive activity of arguing. Edification, the "project of finding new, better, more interesting, more fruitful ways of speaking" (Rorty, 1979, p. 360), suggests that discourse can and does proceed without a set objective in mind. Arguers, for example, can continue arguing 'for the sake of argument' because the act of exchanging divergent views has intrinsic heuristic value. The argumentative effort to juxtapose alternative ways of thinking, acting, and living would probably appeal to someone such as Rorty, who sees one valuable lesson of hermeneutics as its tendency to offer common ground to bridge temporal and cultural lacunae (1979, pp. 365-366). the non-essentialist would understand exhortative argument

as an attempt to offer a possible way to configure a mode of living commensurate with one or more argumentative stances. For the non-essentialist, the exemplar does not provide an argumentative *telos* so much as a gradual working out of implications, connotations, and meaning-possibilities.

It would be useful to pause now and take inventory of how a process-oriented view of argument informs paradigms and models. If argumentation is tied to exemplars, then argumentation proceeds as does life itself: a continual unfolding of the evolving fabric of events. To unpack this metaphor, consider that the agenda for making arguments is not always pre-established. We need not engage in arguments with an objective--instrumental or otherwise--constantly in mind. There is no *logical* requirement that the give-and-take of argumentation presume a justification for the argumentative process itself (cf. Weimer, 1984).

The entelechial perspective and edification indicate a point adumbrated in Fisher's work on narrativity. Arguers proceed according to the alternatives presented by the diachronic progression of their arguments. Each move in an argumentative interaction is authorized not primarily or exclusively by formal rules transcending particular argumentative exchanges, but by the internal structure of the argumentative framework and the connections, discovered or invented, between arguments and those who judge them. In short, arguments are not discrete from their implications and applications.

The connections between arguments, arguers, and consequences point to yet another dividend of the exhortative perspective. Exhortation provides a convenient way to conceptualize the social and technical spheres of argument. There is some confusion as to how social and technical argumentation should be conceived. Farrell (1976) treats the social and technical spheres as distinguished by what might best be called the psychological assumptions accompanying each mode of reasoning. This psychologistic bent appears in Farrell's descriptions of social knowledge comprising "conceptions of symbolic relationships," and a "consensus which is attributed to an audience rather than concretely shared" (1976, pp. 4, 6). At other times, the social and technical arenas appear delineated according to the discursive realm within which rhetoric arises and the range of public accountability shouldered by members of that realm. In the Three Mile Island nuclear accident, each so-called nuclear expert engaged only in technical discourse by not dealing with any matters "beyond the margins of precision in his or her discipline (Farrell & Goodnight, 1981, p. 287).

When approached from an exhortative standpoint, social and technical knowledge are not products of personal constructions of audiences or results of arguments originating in particular disciplines or fields. An exhortative approach would treat the social and technical realms as differing degrees of argumentatively induced

interfield cohesion. The more socially oriented an argument is, the more it will be framed in terms directed toward galvanizing diverse interests. The results of this perspective await further development, and its full implications cannot be explored here. An example, however, illustrates my point.

One of National Socialism's most remarkable features was its ability to unite behind a common cause the various discontented factions of Weimar Germany (Guerin, 1973, p. 63; Schoenbaum, 1967, pp. 55-57). The unity was not absolute, but it sufficed to bond large segments of the population, from laborers to intellectuals (Weinreich, 1946), sufficiently to enable the nation to act as if it were a single organic whole. This unification is by no means unique to fascism. Any ideologically grounded argument is inherently social to the extent that it coordinates and channels diversity for the purpose of strengthening a particular interest portrayed as universal (cf. Giddens, 1979, pp. 193-194; Charland, 1987, p. 148n). Ideological arguments, therefore, far from being mere partisan propaganda, enact a dialectic between social and technical argumentative strategies and tactics. On one hand, ideological argument is 'social' because it marshals diversity in order to unify support for a cause deemed universal. On the other hand, ideological argument is 'technical' insofar as it is 'false consciousness' which

forces argumentative alternatives to conform to the ideology's criteria for effective argumentation.

What I have labeled the 'technical' side of ideology points to a corollary advantage the exhortative view holds over other theories. Johnstone (1978) proposes bilaterality as a necessary condition for effective argumentation. Bilaterality amounts to what could be seen as an argumentative Golden Rule: Argue unto others as you would have them argue unto you. Effective argumentative exchanges, according to Johnstone, can occur only when interlocutors submit to the argumentative criteria of one of the contested positions and attack the position from within.

My example of fascism demonstrates the limits of bilaterality. When the distribution of power among arguers is unequal, argumentation is already skewed toward the standards of prevailing power interests. In the case of Nazism, counter-arguments could occur only within a National Socialist framework of assumptions. Suppose, however, that the Nazis permitted free argumentative exchange. Even in this case, bilaterality would be inapplicable, because the basic ground rule of Nazism is that internal consistency and rationality should be subsumed by mysticism and fanatical devotion (Guerin, 1973, pp. 63-76; Bullock, 1964, pp. 372-373; Hitler, 1927/1971, p. 457). Bilaterality, therefore, is useful only when argumentation proceeds in accordance with traditional canons of rationality.

If exemplars enter the picture, however, argumentation includes attempts to persuade within mythic as well as philosophical, jurisprudential, or scientific contexts. One implication of Fisher's work on narrativity is that argumentation often involves a choice among narrative alternatives (Fisher, 1985, p. 358). Argumentative exchanges, therefore, need not occur solely on a propositional or semantic level but also as proposed narratives and counter-narratives, a pragmatic level. If a primary argumentative tactic of Nazism, for example, was to offer a divinely inspired savior to cure the ills of war-ravaged Germany, pointing out Hitler's logical inconsistencies and close-mindedness would be impotent challenges.[4]

An adherent to the exhortative view might counsel opponents of Nazism to offer a counter-hero and weave a narrative which would rely on mythical bases comparable to the fascist alternative. I readily admit that an exhortative perspective does not guarantee a plausible counter-argument to fascism, but it at least sets the stage for making such arguments. Exhortative argument would appeal to the fundamental characteristics of the form(s) of life within which fascist discourse is likely to emerge.

4. This attempt to use logic as a weapon against Nazism is reflected in the parenthetical remarks accompanying early editions of *Mein Kampf* in English translation. General semanticists used a similar tactic by suggesting a scientific model for proper speech. The general semantic linguistic reform would supposedly provide a counterpoise to the aberrant, misguided words of fascist leaders. See Lee, 1941.

Conclusion

This essay represents a suggestion for avenues of research rather than a finished project. Despite its cursory nature, several preliminary implications may be traced. First, argumentation should be considered an activity inextricably bound to human conduct. My contention that argumentation is life-embedded goes beyond the elaboration of social contexts. If arguments are manifestations of forms of life, then the unfolding of the argumentative process serves to uncover the communicative activities constitutive of human action. The result of this consideration is that what people are is woven into what they do.

A second point of this essay is that argumentation is inseparable from the agents making the arguments. The intertwining of arguer and argument shows how accountability always goes hand in hand with arguing. Attempts to dissociate arguer and argument can ultimately allow arguments to assume a life of their own, apart from human control of influence. Once we relinquish our responsibility to take part in the formation, judgment, and consequences of arguments, we surrender to the relentless, impersonal march of Fate, History, Science, or any other transcendent manipulator of human destiny.

The utility of an exhortative outlook on argumentation can be proven only through further examination and application. Treating arguments as exhortative provides no

formulae for constructing or evaluating arguments. the exhortative approach also does not pre-empt or subsume other theories of argument. If, however, a small addition to our view of communication might result from another entry into the already crowded realm of argument theories, then my efforts will have been worthwhile.

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